

Counterfeit Mitigation in IC Supply Chains


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Counterfeiting Problems


- Lack of visibility on provenance of procured components
- Available tracking data of procured components is fragmented and not 100% trustworthy
- Hard to keep component suppliers accountable for their conduct

- Platform integrated with the whole supply chain, to reliably record the history of each procured component
 - Better visibility on suppliers
 - Availability of tracking data about procured components
 - Ability to prove the bad conduct of suppliers
- Platform distributed over different countries and regulatory frameworks
 - Which organisation/institution would be best placed to control such a platform?
 - A decentralised approach would be more suitable

- How to build such decentralised tracking platform?
 - Consortium Blockchain
- How to identify components within the supply chain?
 - Physically Unclonable Function (PUF)

Based on: *L. Aniello, B. Halak, P. Chai, R. Dhall, M. Mihalea, A. Wilczynski.*
"Anti-BIUFF: towards counterfeit mitigation in IC supply chains using blockchain and PUF." *International Journal of Information Security (2020): 1-16.*

- Decentralised system of peer nodes to store transactions
 - Ledger of transactions
 - Transactions added in batches (blocks)
 - Each node keeps a copy of the ledger
- Additional mechanisms to ensure ledger copies are kept consistent
- Strong guarantees on transaction integrity and availability
- Best known example: Bitcoin
 - Open membership
 - Transactions are public
 - Proof-of-Work – a new block generated every 10 minutes



- Limitations of Bitcoin-like blockchain
 - Bad performance
 - High latency (8-12 minutes in Bitcoin, 12 seconds in Ethereum)
 - Low throughput (3-7 tx/s in Bitcoin, 23-25 tx/s in Ethereum)
 - Privacy
 - Stability
- Consortium blockchain
 - Managed by a consortium of companies
 - Closed membership → better privacy
 - Authenticated nodes → no need for Proof-of-Work
 - More efficient mechanisms can be used
 - No cryptocurrency → better stability

- A physical entity whose behaviour is a function of its structure and the inherent random variations introduced by the chip manufacturing process
- A PUF can be integrated inside electronic components
- Two identical devices have two distinct PUF-based input/output behaviours
- PUF can be used to identify ICs reliably
 - This requires a set of challenge-response pairs
- PUF-based IC identification is tamper-proof





Image from <http://rijndael.ece.vt.edu/puf/background.html>

Anti-counterfeiting Blockchain- and PUF-based infrastructure



Anti-counterfeiting Blockchain- and PUF-based infrastructure

Tracking Mechanism

1. **Registration** – `registerItem()`
 - Challenge-response (CR) batch of the PUF obfuscated and stored
2. **Shipping** – `shipItem()`
3. **Delivery and Verification**
 - **Delivery** – `deliverItem()`
 - **Release of CR batch** – `releaseCRDBatch()`
 - **Verification** – `verifyItem()`

Anti-counterfeiting Blockchain- and PUF-based infrastructure

Attack Analysis

- If an adversary tampers with an IC somewhere in the supply chain
 - The function computed by the PUF is highly likely to change
 - The verification step would show the IC has been tampered with
- CR batches and other data stored in the blockchain cannot be modified
- Counterfeit ICs can be detected accurately
 - However, if the adversary were the supplier that registers the item, then they could compromise CR batches too...

Anti-counterfeiting Blockchain- and PUF-based infrastructure

Limitations and Future Work

- Different types of attack
- Privacy
- Performance and scalability
- Integration of PUF inside products
- Integration of the tracking platform within a supply chain