

Prototyping the Smart Ballot Box

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Agenda

- The SBB and Capability Hardware
- SysML model
- Potential SBB designs
- Demonstrator and attack

The SBB and Capability Hardware

- The SBB using off-the-shelf components
 - Easy to swap components out
 - Rapid prototyping
 - Reduced functionality per component:
 - Lends itself to compartmentalisation
 - Fail to stop as opposed to fail to vulnerable
 - Can derive localised threat model

The SBB and Capability Hardware

- Is capability hardware needed for an air gaped device?
 - Yes, air gapping can be bypassed
 - Stuxnet human failure to follow procedure
 - SolarWinds supply chain hack
 - Yes, elections are significant targets
 - Yes, air gapping interrupted for data up/down load
- The mix of a highly secure bespoke system with off-theshelf components allows for the development of new best practice

The SBB and Capability Hardware

- Building a physical prototype allows for extensive testing
 - Security includes both software and hardware elements
 - Components are not standard and well understood, which undermines software simulation
- Morello capabilities used in final prototype
 - SBB System Model Refinement Strategy as requirements
 - Compartmentalisation to build on MAC advantage
 - Least privilege: only the rights needed to operate
 - Control flow deviation and software state manipulation

Domain context



System of Interest



Balloting system



Trade study: analysis



Trade study





System of Interest

• Black box : Internals not yet specified





White box

- Logical subsystem
- Too many possibilities without further testing
- The need to better understand components
- Five potential designs
 - Balloting system::Ballot ingest unit
 - Off-the-shelf sensors and actuators
 - Foamboard and upcycling for testing, then prototyping with 3D printed housing and parts













Thank you Questions?